The Immediate Postwar Era, 1945-55 In the ten-year period from the mid-1940s through the mid-1950s, advances in technology and nuclear weapons development greatly altered the war at sea. As the Soviet Union established her new defensive position in Eastern Europe, her maritime frontiers remained exposed. In both the Baltic and Black Seas, the Kremlin did not have a naval component worthy of the name, whereas her potential adversaries were well-established sea powers. From the Kremlin's perspective, an amphibious invasion was not only possible, but highly probable. Consequently, the navy had to be reconstructed as quickly as possible with an emphasis on air power and submarines.
The Soviets learned quickly, especially from captured German experts and German warships, including U-boats, that were incorporated into the Soviet Navy. With the completion of previously ordered vessels after July 1945, the overall readiness of the fleet continued unabated. The navy experimented with improved models of submarines already on the drawing boards. Using the German method of submarine construction, building submarines in sections and then welding them together, the Soviets managed to increase production. In 1950, the Soviets used this technique to good effect in their Whisky class modeled after the German Type XXI design. It was smaller, however, but capable of reaching submerged speeds of 15 knots. While the Whisky class could not favorably compare with the U.S. Navy's Tang, the Soviets managed to produce 240 boats between 1951 and 1957 . By this time, Soviet designers were already preparing the next generation of submarines, the Zulu class, a larger and longer-range submarine than the Whiskys. But there was another issue of concern for the Soviet Navy in the early 1950s.
The Korean War, 1950-53 The Kremlin found it impossible to build aircraft carriers owing to the fragile state of the Soviet economy. Instead, the Soviet Navy relied once more on shore-based aviation. Immediately before the outbreak of the Korean War, the naval air arm underwent modernization as jet models-MiG-9 and the Yak-15-were introduced in 1946. Shortly, more advanced designs including the displaced the MiG-9 and Yak-15. Over time, the MiG-15 became the workhorse for both the air force and the Soviet Navy. Soon jet designs phased out the older models that had remained in the naval inventory since World War II. Naval aviation became the premier arm of the surface navy since Soviet surface forces lacked the punch necessary to deal a crippling blow to either the U.S. Navy or the Royal Navy, and the Whiskys had limited range.
Since the Cold War, Western analysts and historians have debated the role of the Soviet Union in the Korean War. In the long and protracted history of the Cold War, it was only in Korea that pilots from the Soviet Union and United States confronted each other in aerial combat. Sometime between November 1950 and January 1951, a regiment from the Air Defense Forces (PVO) was sent to the Korean theater. A majority of the aircraft came from the 303rd Air Defense Division. To confuse American intelligence, the Soviets painted the planes with Chinese markings and stationed them in northwest China within easy air distance of the front.
The Soviets consolidated their aviation assets into the 64th Air Defense Corps. Roughly 72,000 men served in Korea during the war, with the peak level reaching nearly 26,000 men in 1952. Lieutenant General G. A. Lobov was the Soviet commander, following his arrival in Vladivostok. While there, Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov told him that he could not rely upon the naval version of the MiG-15, since the United States probably would retaliate by attacking Soviet facilities. Despite those concerns, Kuznetsov did his utmost to provide the pilots and even the MiG-15s that Lobov needed. The introduction of the MiG-15 forced the United States to send F-86 Sabres to Korea in order to nullify the Communists in the air. The Soviets naturally exaggerated their successes-the Kremlin claimed to have shot down 1,300 aircraft while only losing 200 pilots. The actual number of aircraft shot down was much lower, and Soviet losses much greater; perhaps as many as 420 Soviet pilots were lost in the conflict.
Stalin's death in 1953 allowed for an orderly termination of the conflict and also a change in fortunes for the navy. By the conclusion of the action, naval aviation, for instance, stood at approximately 4,000 planes all told, including nearly 2,000 fighters. As the political situation changed, and N. S. Khrushchev consolidated his authority, he reversed much of Stalin's influence over the armed forces. Khrushchev believed that the navy was outdated, in light of the military-technological revolution, particularly in an age of missiles and jets, and he didn't think that Admiral Kuznetsov, who had followed the purges, was capable of leading the navy during the period of reorganization. If not Kuznetsov, then who should command Soviet naval forces at that critical time?
The Navy in the Age of Khrushchev When Khrushchev came to power, a major change in naval policy was in the offing. Unlike Stalin, he was not committed to a blue-water navy. So in the summer of 1955, Khrushchev circulated a memorandum from Admiral Kuznetsov concerning future naval construction within the Central Committee and arranged for a formal discussion of the issue in the Presidium. According to Khrushchev, he had invited select military figures to attend, including Kuznetsov and Bulganin, Khrushchev's ally and minister of defense. Kuznetsov's proposals staggered the Party leadership; the meeting concluded without reaching a clear decision, but Kuzentsov realized the fate of the navy hinged on the outcome.
Kuznetsov could neither accept nor tolerate Khrushchev's attitude toward the fleet and, according to Khrushchev's account, shouted, "How long do I have to tolerate such an attitude toward my navy?" Not long after, after nearly 20 years as commander in chief, Kuznetsov found himself relieved and demoted. Why did Kuznetsov fall? The answer is simple: it was a direct result of his unrelenting desire to establish a balanced fleet and his unwavering challenge to the new collective leadership. Khrushchev's decision to dismiss Kuznetsov could have marked a possible return to a neo-Young School strategy. Instead, Khrushchev turned to a staunch comrade and Party loyalist, Admiral S. G. Gorshkov, a former flotilla commander and postwar commander of the Black Sea Fleet.
With Gorshkov, Khrushchev thought he had found a commander who was solely committed to the new weapons systems produced by the revolution in military technology. In Khrushchev's view, the era of battleships and cruisers was long over; he believed the new age belonged to surface-to-surface missiles and nuclear-powered submarines. It seemed that the idea of creating a balanced fleet, at least for the moment, was over. The new weapons that altered war at sea were sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) and nuclear weapons, according to Khrushchev. Gorshkov even hinted that these new weapons might mark the end of the surface fleet. Over time, Gorshkov managed to modify Khrushchev's plans, but first he adopted Khrushchev's missile development program. By appearing to be a "team player," Gorshkov was able to circumvent Khrushchev's original objectives. Even as early as 1958, Gorshkov managed to declare that the Soviet Union was a major naval power and that the navy deserved missions and materials reflecting the new reality.
But from the start, Gorshkov reinforced the presumption that he was a loyal Khrushchev supporter by reducing the size of the surface fleet by 300 mostly obsolete ships and reducing the size of the naval air arm by half. More important, Gorshkov had demonstrated incredible political savvy, necessary in the byzantine world of Kremlin politics, skills that he finetuned during the early Khrushchev years. Still, although Admiral Gorshkov was willing to follow Khrushchev's lead, he realized that there was a pressing need to modernize the fleet. One of his major achievements was to use his political talents to keep at least 14 Sverdlov class cruisers from the budget ax. At the same time, probably in 1957, Gorshkov started the modernization process with the Krupny class missile destroyers, a design started well before Gorshkov's rise to prominence, but identical to the Tallin class that appeared in 1954.
It appears that the Krupny class was an effort to compensate for the appearance of the new USS Forrestal class carriers then entering American service. If that was the Kremlin's intention, the effort failed, since the associated radars could engage only single targets and needed air cover to survive in a combat environment. Eight Krupnys reached the fleet between 1959 and 1961. The Kildin class experienced similar shortcomings and were the last destroyers armed with surface-to-surface missiles until 1971.
Initially, the Kremlin theorized that the aircraft carriers had lost their primacy, even though American strike carriers were the greatest danger to the Soviet Union. This assumption reflected Khrushchev's own views that aircraft carriers were obsolete, in many cases as obsolete as battleships. This was for public consumption, however; the naval establishment often discussed merits of aircraft carriers in Morskoi sbornik (the Naval Digest). Unfortunately, the journal was closed to Westerners during the critical years of the Cold War. Only following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War have scholars had the opportunity to realize the extent of those discussions in the navy's inner circles.
Most information concerning Soviet carrier decisions came from Nicholas Shadrin, a former Soviet destroyer commander who defected to the West in 1959. According to Shadrin, the Soviet military-army, navy, and defense experts-evaluated the issues throughly in light of recent technological advances. Still, Admiral Gorshkov concluded that the main striking forces of the Soviet Navy should revolve around the surface fleet, submarines, and aviation. Why then, did the Soviets fail to move in the direction of aircraft carriers? According to Shadrin's account, the decision was made in an atmosphere that seriously downplayed the importance of surface combatants. Yet at the same time, Shadrin stressed that this did not mean the total condemnation of such warships. It would appear that Shadrin was hedging his bets concerning the future course of Soviet naval construction.
With Khrushchev's guidance concerning modern technology, the Soviet Navy moved further away from carrier development and placed greater reliance on land-based air power and submarines to counter American naval predominance. By arming surface ships and submarines with cruise missiles, the Soviets were not particularly disturbed by the lack of aircraft carriers in their inventory. For Khrushchev, a reliance on new weapon systems was much more cost-effective than embarking on an exorbitant naval construction program.
Aviation and Submarines in the Khrushchev Era
Before the introduction of anti-ship missiles (ASM) into the naval inventory, aircraft remained the prime nuclear delivery system for the navy. During this period, the missions for Soviet Naval Aviation included strikes against ports and embarkation facilities, as well as anti-ship and anti-submarine roles. The naval air arm expanded to reflect those assignments and by the mid-1950s numbered over 90,000 men and over 4,000 aircraft. Then suddenly, naval aviation experienced a major reorganization. The navy lost most of its fighters to the National Air Defense Units (PVO Strany). In return, fleet aviation received the IL-28 Beagle light bomber to be used in the navy's expanded anti-submarine (ASW) duties. Still, the losses were staggering; aviation strength was reduced from 4,000 aircraft to a mere 800.
The "Whisky Twin Cylinders" were the first Soviet submarines to be outfitted with cruise missiles. Each Whisky class had two SSN-3 launchers on deck, and were followed by the "Whisky Long Bin," another Whisky variant, but with four launchers located in the fin section. It would appear that the new Juliet class, which first entered service in 1962, was designed for such a missile configuration, with two SSN-3 launchers forward and two aft. The Soviets were reacting to the USS Enterprise, the first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, which entered service in 1958. The Enterprise had a speed of 35 knots, equal to the other non-nuclear aircraft carriers in the U.S. Navy, but combined with the USS Long Beach and USS Bainbridge, the Enterprise could serve as a strike force of incredible range that could easily threaten the entire Soviet Union. However, reacting to American upgrades of aircraft carriers and submarines set the development pattern for most future Soviet naval designs.
The diesel-powered boats of the Whisky and Juliet classes were no match for the new carriers entering the American inventory. With those threats in mind, the Soviets responded with the nuclear-powered Echo I class submarines, which resembled the November class, but were armed with cruise missiles. Clearly, they were direct responses to the new American challenge. Echo I boats had the endurance but not the speed to confront the Enterprise and the other American nuclear-powered attack carriers. By 1963, the Echo IIs had replaced the earlier models, and with new hull designs and power plants, could easily threaten Western surface forces. But whereas the SSN-3 had a range of 300 miles, Soviet submarines could only launch when surfaced, further reducing their stealth qualities.
So the Soviets had to upgrade their submarine arm in order to combat the U.S. Navy in a future conflict, especially if the Americans continued to upgraded their strike carriers. As a response, the Soviets launched the Charlies in 1967. This class had an improved speed of nearly 30 knots and a better power plant, but more important, the new SSN-7, like the USN Polaris, could be launched while submerged. Both the Echo and Charlie classes combined torpedoes and ASMs, guaranteed to inflict damage on any potential Soviet adversary. After evaluating the Soviet answer to the emerging American carrier threat, the Kremlin had acted with speed and practicality.
The Period of Forward Deployment
The 1960s marked a further shift in the official Soviet position toward aircraft carriers. By the 1960s, the U.S. Navy had begun to deploy first the Polaris SLBM (submarine launched ballistic missiles) system and subsequently improved SLBM systems, a far more serious threat than the Kremlin had encountered from strike carriers. With the growing prestige of the Soviet Union, aircraft carriers could render a valuable service improving security to the Soviet Union as well as in power projection, long a trademark of the United States. While new warships were still in Soviet shipyards, however, Khrushchev embarked on an adventurous confrontation with the United States during the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962. As a result of that perceived Soviet humiliation, a new era for the Soviet Navy was about to unfold.
It is safe to assume that the period between 1957 and 1964 marked the age of the Soviet Union's limited navy. During that era, the importance of the navy declined proportionally in comparison to the strategic rocket forces in Khrushchev's eyes. Consequently, some individuals within the Soviet naval community realized that the absence of strong surface forces and naval air assets limited Soviet options against all potential adversaries. According to Khrushchev's calculations, a future war would be either a total nuclear exchange or a surrender by one side or the other. The Soviet Union and its navy lacked a non-nuclear option when facing the likelihood of a low intensity conflict. The only remedy was to develop a balanced fleet.
Immediately before Khrushchev's removal, Soviet naval experts waged an effective campaign that challenged the perception of aircraft carriers in general nuclear war. Naval officers claimed that carriers were vulnerable to enemy attack and hence not a viable weapons system for the navy. Instead, they opted for increased development of submarines. Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii concurred and wondered if aircraft carriers were the answer, for the Soviet Union had to oppose the perceived growing belligerency of the United States.
When the Kremlin made the decision to embark on the construction of the 17,500-ton Moskva in 1957-58, the navy had the opportunity to witness the relative ease in which the U.S. Navy supported amphibious operations in Lebanon during the Lebanese crisis in 1958 and the effectiveness of carriers during the American naval blockade of Cuba during the Cuban missile crisis. Likewise the final decisions to go forward with the Moskva-class came when the USN's George Washington-class SSBN and Polaris systems went on line in the 1960s, forcing the Soviet Navy to formulate an effective and comprehensive anti-submarine capability to counter the new threat from American SLBMs.
Naval authorities have debated the issue of carriers since the 1930s in Morskoi sbornik, and in 1963 similar arguments appeared in Voennoistoricheskii Zhurnal, traditionally an army publication. An article titled "Anglo-American Aviation in the Battle with German U-boats in World War II" noted the importance of escort carriers in defeating the Germans during the Battle of the Atlantic, and drew parallels to the current threat raised by the United States. In the author's words, only the technology had changed; the threat remained the same.
The Moskva allowed the Soviets to extend their anti-submarine (ASW) capabilities further out to sea and enabled the navy to conduct ASW surveillance in the Arctic region as well. The chief weakness of the Moskva became evident when the Americans introduced the Poseidon-class SSBNs and missile system. Now the Poseidon's range (2,500 miles) was expanded even further, forcing the Soviets to extend the range of their naval defensive zone. The Moskva-class did not have the capability to handle this challenge with 15 or 20 Hormone ASW helicopters. Soviet authorities realized those shortcomings. Consequently, only two Moskva-class carriers were constructedthe Moskva and her sister, the Leningrad.
As the threat from American SSBNs accelerated, Soviet naval aviation gained in stature. The Soviets realized that carriers could become a major weapon in anti-submarine operations as well as in combined-arms missions with Soviet submarines. Soviet commentators argued for the development of a task-specific carrier to counter the escalating SSBN menace. The final decision to construct a conventional carrier rested with the realization that the Soviet Navy could not control the sea, if it could not control the air. Thus, the period of forward deployment, extending the Soviet naval defensive perimeter to a range of 1,500 nautical miles from Moscow, was conceived. The defensive zone was extended by an additional 1,000 nautical miles in 1967-68, and it was anticipated that this move would curtail all potential threats from carrier strike forces and first generation American SSBNs. The Kremlin may have hoped that a ten-year period would be sufficient to develop a number of future options to the Polaris threat. Unfortunately, such expectations were unduly optimistic.
The difficulty in covering such a wide expanse of ocean eventually forced the Soviets to rethink their naval construction patterns. It would appear that even before the Moskva underwent sea trials, the navy leadership decided to design a new, much larger carrier. At one swoop, Gorshkov pressed for a true, multipurpose nuclear-powered carrier, which would displace approximately 80,000 tons and support an air component of 70 VTOL aircraft. The objective was to provide the aircraft carrier with a fighter, early warning, and attack component, very similar to an American carrier that the Soviets witnessed in operation during the Vietnam War. What happened? Marshal Grechko, minister of defense, died and his replacement, Marshal Ustinov, did not support Grechko's plan. Instead, a compromise was reached and the new design was considerably less ambitious. The new carrier was reduced to about 39,000 tons, with approximately half the air wing. In the new Kiev class Soviet designers incorporated much from the Moskva and improved the ship's command and control capabilities in order to turn the new carrier into a command center for future task forces. The Kiev would have a complement of 36 helicopters and VTOL aircraft, double that of the Moskva.
Unlike the earlier carriers, the Kiev was capable of not only anti-submarine missions, but also anti-anti-submarine assignments (AASW). In such a capacity, the Kiev could overwhelm an opponent's ASW forces and ensure the survivability of Soviet submarines at sea. The Soviets had assumed that the Yak 36/38 Forger fighters would be able to overcome the U.S. Navy's P-3 Orion and any other of its variations, since those aircraft had no air-to-air defense ability. Admiral Gorshkov realized that one of the key failures of the Kriegsmarine during the Second World War was the inability to coordinate their missions with the Luftwaffe. Gorshkov may have believed that the Kiev, and possibly her replacements, could secure a safe passage through the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap during wartime.
The Carrier Debate and the Future of the Soviet Navy
The Kiev and her sister ships allowed the naval air arm, still primarily landbased, to play multiple roles for the navy, from supporting amphibious 1962 1964 1970 1972 1975 1978 1983 1985 1964 1966 1972 1975 1978 1982 1985 1988 18 By 1971, the Soviets had realized that the primary danger to their SSBN bastions came from USN nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs). Combined with nuclear-powered strike carriers, they could overwhelm Soviet ASW defenses and seriously threaten, if not degrade, the Soviet Union's nuclear defenses. The Kremlin came to realize that American carrier-based aircraft could quickly gain air mastery and hence achieve sea denial for Soviet naval forces. Therefore, the Soviets had to embark on a comparable seabased air program. As concerns mounted, discussions took place among Soviet naval experts concerning the construction of aircraft carriers, even though the Soviets came up with a varied nomenclature to describe such ships. The submariners continued to advocate the strengths of submarines, while questioning the value of carriers.
New technology kept outpacing Soviet capabilities just as it had in past naval construction programs. With the commissioning of the Kiev in 1975, the Kremlin had expected to counter the American challenge posed by the Poseidon-class SSBNs, especially when the Kiev was capable of launching and recovering both VTOL aircraft and helicopters. The Americans then countered with the third-generation Ohio-class SSBNs and Trident SLBM systems, forcing the Soviets once again to funnel scarce resources into naval construction. This time the Soviets were determined to build a true mid-size nuclear-powered attack carrier (CVN) of their own. Admiral Gorshkov conducted an internal reexamination of the naval art and the future role of aircraft carriers in an ongoing debate in Morskoi sbornik, begun in 1979, when Soviet naval officers raised legitimate questions concerning the navy's mission, naval construction, and more importantly of a balanced fleet. At the heart of the issue lay the naval art, the theory and practice of conducting naval operations at sea on tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Naval art did not occur in a void, but in collaboration with the other armed services. According to Gorshkov, if the navy sought to be victorious in wartime, the principles of naval art had to be mas-tered in peacetime. From Gorshkov's study of Soviet naval operations in the Second World War, only naval aviation and submarines played a significant part in the refinement of Soviet naval theory.
Soon, Admiral K. A. Stalbo, a leading Soviet naval theorist, argued for aircraft carriers by noting the increasing emphasis that carriers played in world politics following the Second World War. What is remarkable is Stalbo's sudden conversion to carriers; it reflected a remarkable shift from his earlier position. Now aircraft carriers provided the Soviet Union with presence and suasion to such a level that the admiral wrote of a new age of carrier diplomacy. Stalbo did not rest there. He went further by arguing that aircraft carriers could even render viable the possibility of achieving hegemony in regions of the world deemed vital to Soviet interests as well as defending SLOC (sea lines of communication) and SSBN bastions.
The centerpiece of Stalbo's contention involved the realization that the Soviet Union had to develop a comparable carrier platform with the West to fulfill the navy's mission. In this regard, Stalbo stressed the need to build a 50,000-ton, mid-size carrier, which was more economical than building another, less cost-effective Kiev. The admiral, speaking more like a Pentagon spokesperson, remarked that the mid-size carrier could handle more aircraft at a fraction of the overall cost. He seriously doubted whether the position of carriers would wane in the future and actually stressed that the role of carriers would expand over time.
Stalbo's article rocked the Soviet naval establishment, for it challenged the Soviet perception of cruise missiles, ICBMs, and submarines in future naval conflicts. Whereas Stalbo argued for the carrier's place within a balanced fleet, others, most notably Rear Admiral A. Pushkin, led the charge for submarines. To prove his point, Pushkin reexamined submarine operations during the Second World War. In the first of a series of articles, Pushkin reviewed the course of the submarine war in the Pacific, particularly submarine operations against aircraft carriers. Pushkin challenged Stalbo's central thesis that carriers played the predominant role in the conflict. The old submariner did not stop there; he went further by claiming that Stalbo overlooked the obvious vulnerability of carriers to submarine attack.
Pushkin kept up his barrage in other articles analyzing both German and Japanese submarine forces in the war. The message was clear: modern submarines pose a very serious threat to aircraft carriers. With the emergence of new technologies that enhanced radios and sonars, submerged attacks would be more effective than they were in the last war. Pushkin grudgingly had to acknowledge that mounting an effective submarine war against an aggressive and comprehensive ASW defense would be costly, particularly with the reliance upon shore-based aviation combined with an organic ASW capability.
Pushkin went even further by seeking allies in the other services to oppose Stalbo by pointing to Stalbo's failure to acknowledge the Eastern Front's predominant role in the Great Patriotic War, an issue that was not lost on aging veterans. Likewise, Pushkin would not accept Stalbo's assumption that the carrier was on an equal footing with the submarine. In his defense, Pushkin quoted Gorshkov's opinion in Sea Power of the State, in which he claimed that surface ships had lost their former place to naval aviation and submarines.
Still, Stalbo's critics failed to silence the vice admiral, who called for a comprehensive review of Soviet naval doctrine to take into account the technological advances made since the Second World War. Stalbo made his case in a two-part article in Morskoi sbornik in 1981, where he addressed the Soviet Union's need for a balanced fleet. His reinterpretation of the command of the sea further contributed to a new and more savage wave of criticism, particularly his proposal for a new, 50,000-ton mid-size carrier. Stalbo argued that the new carrier should be placed on an equal footing with other branches of the Soviet Navy-including submarines, surface forces, and land-based aviation. The extent of the debate and the intensity of the opposition surprised not only Stalbo, but also his main supporter, Admiral Gorshkov.
The next wave of criticism came from Rear Admiral G. Kostev, who was the commanding officer of the naval faculty at the Lenin Political-Military Academy. Kostev's position as an academic gave considerable weight to the anti-Stalbo forces that emerged during the course of the carrier controversy. The most serious charge Kostev leveled against Stalbo was that the admiral was attempting to draft a new and completely independent naval doctrine, totally alien to the Soviet military tradition. Kostev argued that it was impossible to separate the navy from the general defense capability of the Soviet Union, which now became the central weakness in Stalbo's argument.
Although Kostev and his allies had always acknowledged the importance of combined arms operations in naval theory as it had occurred in the Second World War, another of Stalbo's opponents, Captain First Rank B. Makeev, maintained that naval blockades could be especially effective by using various arms of the navy, such as nuclear-powered submarines, land-based and sea-based aviation, and other surface combatants. Makeev's discussion went so far as to even avoid the term "aircraft carrier"; he referred to them as "aircraft carrying surface ships." Makeev represented naval officers, particularly submariners, who were threatened by carriers and carrier-based aviation.
The ensuing debate among flag officers and their surrogates soon attracted the attention of American analysts, who concluded that Gorshkov could be in political trouble. The perceived threat came from Admiral V. N. Chernavin, a young and up-and-coming submariner. When Chernavin entered the fray his attacks had serious political overtones, since he had commanded the Northern Fleet, and currently was the navy's chief-of-staff. Chernavin's leading complaint against Stalbo concerned his near total disregard for a unified theory.
The magnitude and breadth of the reaction to Stalbo created the impression, not totally mistaken, that a major change within the navy was in the offing. The change in command did occur, but it happened later rather than sooner, at least later than most analysts thought at the time. By the mid-1980s, the up-and-coming leaders in the Kremlin power structure realized that there was a need for younger men to implement the Soviet Union's future naval policy. It is fair to say that Gorshkov, the architect of the modern Soviet Navy, retained his position following the debates, but his fate clearly was sealed by the shifting political climate in the Kremlin. Even as the carrier debates were coming to an end, a small local conflict in the South Atlantic, the Falklands, demonstrated to the naval leadership the value of carriers in a future conflict at sea.
The Retirement of Admiral Gorshkov
Gorshkov's ultimate retirement resulted from a variety of factors that originated in the early 1980s, the least of which was his advanced age. In 1956, when he became comander-in-chief of the navy, he was already 46 and by early 1985 he was already 75. The logical heir to Gorshkov's post was Chernavin, an ambitious officer, the first deputy chief of staff of the navy, and a key player in the carrier debate. The post is significant, since there is a tendency to promote the first deputy to the next higher post, commander-inchief. But if Chernavin was to be promoted, a number of more senior candidates for the billet, such as N. I. Smirnov, would have to be bypassed. Smirnov, for instance, had held the same post since 1974, but his advancing years kept him from being considered as a candidate. Chernavin's elevation sent a clear signal not only to the navy, but also to the rest of the Soviet military, that the new leader, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, wanted his own team to direct the defense establishment.
The reasons for Gorshkov's retirement were complex. Clearly, the carrier debates were damaging to the admiral's position. Also, it appeared that some personalities in the Kremlin apparently believed that Gorshkov was unable to cope with the complex nature of modern technology and appreciate the potential that it offered. Likewise, the changing political winds in Moscow may have demanded a shuffle in the naval command. Yuri Andropov, one of Gorbachev's early supporters, had little faith in Gorshkov because of his past record of political independence as well as his advocacy of controversial weapons programs. But probably the most egregious complaint about Gorshkov concerned the fear of a "cult of personality" that surrounded the admiral; a similar charge was used against Marshal Zhukov in the 1950s, following the death of Stalin.
To the United States and NATO, the Soviet Navy as envisaged by Admiral Gorshkov faced a challenge that defied both Hitler and the Kaiser; to maintain an effective submarine blockade of the North Atlantic shipping lanes. To accomplish that mission, the navy continued to expand and modernize, particularly the submarine branch on which so much depended. By the mid-1980s the Soviet Union had the largest submarine force the world had seen since the Second World War. At that time, the Soviet Union had a submarine inventory three times larger than its American counterpart, yet the Soviets continued to build yet more submarines. Western intelligence sources reported to Washington that the Soviets had up to seven different submarine classes in production. No other major power went to such lengths to produce submarines as the Soviet Union. American intelligence analysts believed that the Soviets could build up to 20 nuclear submarines a year, if Soviet suppliers could maintain their ambitious construction schedule. Still, many analysts in the West feared that improved Soviet submarines were in the design pipeline. As the navy expanded so did the defense budget. By all accounts, especially by Kremlin watchers, Gorshkov was one of the best connected military figures still in service, an element that Gorbachev was not unlikely to miss. Not only was Gorshkov associated with the old guard, according to the youthful Gorbachev, he was the old guard.
By the mid-1980s, the continued expansion of the navy was well beyond what the new Kremlin could afford. The particular timing of Gorshkov's retirement, combined with the launching of the new 65,000-ton carrier, Tbilisi, raised questions in Western capitals about that very issue. But in many ways, Gorshkov's retirement reflected the sudden move toward younger men in key positions in both the navy and the army. Chernavin's elevation to commander-in-chief did not mean a shift in naval priorities. Instead, Chernavin continued to follow the Gorshkov legacy to a point, at the same time placating his sponsor, Mikhail Gorbachev. This required a major shift from open-ocean maritime offensive operations to anti-SLOC mis-sions. The new naval doctrine reduced the need for costly and expensive port facilities in Vietnam and operations in the Pacific, for example.
Gorbachev's Navy and the Collapse of the Soviet Union
One component of this shift in naval development was the emphasis placed upon Gorbachev's domestic program of perestroika. Chernavin had reported to Gorbachev that the previous assumption that the use of submarines alone could defeat the West had collapsed. In time, Western analysts observed that Soviet out-of-area operations were reduced by 6 percent per annum during the years between 1986 and 1989. Those sudden reductions probably were used to offset the economic shortfalls in the Five-Year Plan from 1986 to 1990. Still, many analysts in NATO countries continued to play it safe and assumed that the Soviet Navy would continue to seek foreign bases at the very time when the facilities were being closed. It was nearly incomprehensible that Gorbachev would seek a serious reduction in armaments.
Those changes came precisely at the time when the Soviets had realized their long-held dream of developing a true carrier capability. With the construction of the Tbilisi or the Leonid Brezhnev (it went by many different names), the Soviets had to find a way to skirt the 1936 Montreux Convention, which restricted the movement of carriers through the Turkish Straits. In order to avoid the diplomatic stipulations of the Montreux agreements, 1983 1985 1981 1985 1985 1982 1982 the Soviets notified the Turks that the Tbilisi was a heavy aircraft carrying cruiser, in other words, an improved Kiev. Finally the Soviets could take to sea the best of their aviation inventory-MiG-29 Fulcrums, Su-25 Frogfoots, Su-27 Flankers, and Su-24 Fencers. But this development occurred precisely when Gorbachev realized that the economy had to be both modernized and reformed. The Cold War and the expensive military and naval procurement programs placed a considerable strain on the Soviet economy. Ever since 1979, the Soviet economy had grown slowly and had faced the likelihood of negative economic growth by 1980. This startling evidence forced the Kremlin to meet that threat and the new challenge of the Reagan administration's massive arms buildup. Georgi Arbatov, an influential Soviet insider, noted that although Brezhnev argued with the military at times, the generals and admirals still managed to get most of what they wanted in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but he was worried even more about the impact it would have on the nation. Arbatov and his colleagues at the Institute of the U.S. and Canada in Moscow believed that by building carriers, the Soviet Union was falling into a U.S. trap, since the Soviet Union would be playing into American strengths. Soviet policy "wonks," like their American counterparts, questioned the wisdom of building another aircraft carrier.
Gorbachev's economic and political reforms alienated many officials in the bureaucracy and the military, who longed for a return of the order and discipline of the Brezhnev era. The reduction of tensions with the United States and the desire to reduce the military budget drove some military officers to ally themselves with the Party and the security services. The objective was to topple Gorbachev. If Gorbachev was to remain in power, he had to return to traditional Communist orthodoxy. Unfortunately, many Western observers were blind to what was about to happen. They overlooked the loss of prestige and status within the officer corps, the military defeat in Afghanistan, and the deteriorating economy, and failed to predict the coup. Conservative elements in the army and the KGB played on those fears, particularly with the breakup of the Soviet Union. Soon, National Bolshevik and protofascist organizations emerged, some with the active support of the KGB.
In the months leading to the 19-21 August 1991 putsch, the navy, like the other services, faced cutbacks in appropriations, which were reflected in the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan, which began in 1991. All told, the navy would lose 26 submarines, an air regiment, a naval infantry unit, and 45 surface vessels. Western analysts reported that most of those assets were obsolete and, in time, that the cuts would eventually increase the overall effectiveness of the navy. But more dangerous was the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which would mean the loss of bases in the Baltic and the Black Sea, and raised serious questions concerning the fate of the Black Sea Fleet itself.
The history of the August 1991 coup has been told elsewhere, but it is important to remember that the air force, strategic rocket forces, and the navy did not take part in the conspiracy to topple Gorbachev. Chernavin may have been aware of the plotters' intentions, but his name does not appear on the Declaration of the Committee for the State of Emergency (GKChP). Instead, Admiral Chernavin, General Yuri Maksimov, and Marshal Shaposhnikov opposed the putschists. Shaposhnikov undoubtedly played the most important role, since he had the forces at hand to use against the GKChP. On one hand, he arranged for the transportation of airborne troops to the Kremlin to arrest the ringleaders, and on the other hand, he warned the GKChP not to attack the White House. If they did, he was prepared to order his bombers to conduct an air strike on the Kremlin.
When the coup collapsed, there were repercussions in the navy. Chernavin had emerged from the crisis as a supporter of the government. The commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral Mikhail N. Khrongopulo, had gambled that the coup would succeed; he was relieved. Admiral Vitalii P. Ivanov, who in the past questioned Gorbachev's reforms in the Baltic States, walked a fine line with the Baltic Fleet. Although he lost his command in the aftermath, he remained on active duty by becoming the commandant of the Kuznetsov Naval Academy. Both commanders of the North and Pacific Fleets retained their commands, even though the local Soviet had its doubts concerning the loyalty of Admiral Gennadi A. Khvatov, since he placed the Pacific Fleet on a heightened state of readiness. Following a special session of the local Soviet, Khvatov was exonerated, yet the damage was done. The coup and subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union further weakened the Soviet Navy to the point of no longer posing a threat to NATO or the West.
Over time, the once feared Soviet Navy slowly rusted away in port. One authority wondered how many vessels, particularly how many aircraft carriers, were up for sale. The decommissioning started in 1992 when the Ulyanovsk, Minsk, and Leningrad were sent to the breakers. The Novorossiysk followed a year later; the Kiev lasted until 1994. Rumors persisted that the Varyag could be sold and converted into a floating hotel, but it is virtually certain that construction will never be finished. The fate of the Gorshkov has led to the most conjecture. Reports reached the press on a weekly basis that the Gorshkov was either to be sold or leased to India, which finally bought it in October 2000. But the Russian governments of Boris Yeltsin and, currently, Vladimir Putin are less interested in carriers than their Soviet predecessors. Showing the flag has reached a more critical stage, evidenced when the Kuznetsov was sent to the Adriatic during the recent Bosnian crisis, representing a true blue-water navy. The Soviet Navy had come full circle, from the mutinies and decay that the navy experienced in 1918 until today, when the navy has become a luxury that the new Kremlin leadership has found difficult, if not impossible, to maintain.
